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ABSTRACT 
Currently, there are no secure access control methods of 
controlling restricted material access on a mobile device 
using context-based authentication methods.  Simple 
challenge/response protocols do not provide the security 
required for some restricted information.  A lost/misplaced 
device or compromised password can easily lead to the 
compromise of any restricted information to which the 
device may have access.  Due to the inherent portability of 
a mobile device, a broader, more comprehensive set of 
access controls is required. 
This thesis will research and build a prototype 
application that will allow access to restricted 
information, stored on the device itself, based on a set of 
predefined contexts using the device’s own hardware. 
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When a natural disaster occurs, within hours first 
responders are on the scene.  They bring with them a 
plethora of equipment to help them aid the victims of the 
disaster.  Most likely this equipment includes some sort of 
mobile device to access restricted personnel 
files/information. The security of the data and 
communications exchanged is paramount.  The current 
mechanisms to secure that data restricting its access to a 
specified user in a specific situation or location are 
insufficient. 
As mobile devices penetrate into the daily lives of 
personnel with access to restricted data, the risks of 
compromise of that data increase. Given how important 
mobile devices have become in the daily lives of their 
users, better ways of securing information on those devices 
are needed.  According to the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights, there 
have been more than 420 security breaches in 2009 of the 
medical records of 19 million patients [1]. Many of these 
breaches involve critical personally identifiable 
information (PII) stored on portable electronic devices.  
The breaches are results of these devices falling into 
malicious hands without the proper security features to 
protect the data. 
As businesses continually shift to a Bring Your Own 
Device (BYOD) policy, the history of security breaches 
since 2009 are evidence that the research into securing the 
information on those devices has not kept up with the pace 
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of that shift.  Most data securing programs rely on a 
simple challenge/response protocol to protect the 
information, leaving all of the security in the hands of 
the user.  A more reliable, administrator controlled set of 
security features is needed.  An architecture designed 
around a mobile security enclave, with device-measured 
context access controls, addresses this increased security 
need. 
A. MOBILE SECURITY ENCLAVE 
A mobile security enclave is a method of access 
control between a collection of valuable assets and the 
mobile device.  The enclave contains protected applications 
and only allows a user access to them when certain 
conditions exist [2].  These conditions, better known as 
contexts, are the key to the security of the applications.  
They must be out of the control of the user of the system 
and difficult to bypass.  Hardware sensors of the mobile 
device can serve as an adequate set of security contexts to 
restrict access to protected applications.   
B. OBJECTIVES 
The goal of this thesis is to develop a prototype 
service that runs on a mobile device and restricts access 
to applications installed on the mobile device based on a 
set of contexts controlled by an administrator at setup.  
The prototype consists of an Android service (application) 
that utilizes built-in hardware to measure contexts on 
which to grant access to other protected (enclaved) 
applications and any data associated with them.  In the 
initial service, three contexts will be used to grant 
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access to the enclave: global positioning system 
coordinates, base transceiver station identification (CID) 
and the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) 
number. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides a brief discussion of the need for 
a more secure method of protecting proprietary/restricted 
information.  The chapter is made up of two sections: One 
discusses the idea of the context-based application enclave 
and its associated contexts and the other explains the 
overall objectives of this thesis. 
Chapter II provides a description of existing security 
programs and applications.  The discussion includes their 
strengths and weaknesses and how the prototype Android 
service fills the gaps left by these applications.  The 
Android operating system and included security features, 
along with the Android software development kit, are also 
discussed.   
Chapter III outlines the architectural design used in 
creating the prototype Android service.  The design of the 
contexts, enclave, and administrative functions are also 
discussed.   
Chapter IV explains the implementation of the 
architectural design described in Chapter III.  The use of 
the Android software development kit (SDK) and its 
associated classes are discussed.  The administrator 
installation and setup are also included in this chapter, 
along with user functions and a step-by-step walkthrough. 
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Chapter V provides the reader with a summary and a 
brief overview of the prototype Android service created for 
this thesis.  It is discussed in this chapter that it is 
possible to create an Android application that successfully 
protects other Android applications installed on the same 
device, using hardware-measured contexts.  This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of possible future research 




This chapter provides the relevant background 
knowledge to support the following chapters.  It includes 
descriptions of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies, a 
discussion of Android Operating System inner-workings and 
security and related mobile device components and 
capabilities.  
B. BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE 
Since the advent of the smartphone, more wireless 
infrastructure in support of communications and data 
exchange is necessary to support the growing use of 
personal devices in the workplace.  BYOD is a trend of 
employees using personally owned devices in their place of 
work for both personal and business use.  While cost and 
convenience are the two dominant positive aspects of BYOD, 
there are a few negative aspects to a BYOD policy that, 
with good mitigation controls, can be substantially 
reduced.  
A business that operates a BYOD policy shifts costs of 
data plans and devices to the user, can take advantage of 
newer technology faster, and have reduced IT support 
requirements.  Allowing employees to use their personal 
devices for business transactions removes the need for both 
the employer to provide costly devices to the user and the 
need for the user to carry multiple devices.  Users also 
tend to keep their devices on a faster replacement cycle 
than that of the average company, keeping electronic 
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infrastructure of the business more up-to-date.  Since the 
company does not provide the devices, the need for IT 
support for the hardware is not required (support for 
software installed on the users’ devices will most likely 
still be necessary, especially if organization-specific 
applications are deployed on the devices). 
On the other-hand, the BYOD policy does not come 
without its risks.  To start with, the content provider 
loses control over the IT hardware and how it is used.  
When businesses issue hardware to their employees, the 
devices are usually accompanied by usage policies, which 
dictate what can and can’t be done with the device.  Almost 
every aspect of the devices are managed and controlled by 
the management.  With a BYOD policy, both business and 
personal applications/data are stored on the device.  This 
leads to a higher possibility of compromise of restricted 
business applications/data by other users who may share the 
device or worse, malicious software designed with the 
intention of compromising said material. Clearly, loss or 
theft of the device affects data security whether the 
device of corporate-owned or BYOD. 
While exercising a BYOD policy, a simple 
challenge/response protocol may not meet the restrictive 
needs to protect the information/data stored on the device.  
Compromise of the devices location, network connection, and 
user are not accounted for when utilizing a 
challenge/response protocol.  A more comprehensive set of 
contexts on which to grant access is needed.  
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C. ANDROID OPERATING SYSTEM 
The Android Operating System is built on the Linux 
kernel with libraries and Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs), which use Java compatible libraries 
based on Apache Harmony (an open source Java implementation 
developed by the Apache Software Foundation).  Android APIs 
are a set of programming code that allows applications to 
communicate with the operating system [3].  The set of APIs 
that are included in the Android Software Development Kit 
(SDK) is what allows the programmer to create applications 
on or for the Android OS that uses the device’s hardware.  
Many of the APIs are open to the public and give access to 
services such as basic telephony data, location specific 
information (which is used in this thesis), and GSM and 
CDMA functions. Others are closed to the public and need 
special permissions for use, or are strictly controlled by 
the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) [3].  Figure 1 
depicts the Android programming architecture as presented 
on the Android Developer’s site [4]. 
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Figure 1.   Android Application Architecture 
The Android operating system uses the Dalvik virtual 
machine with “just-in-time” compilation to run Dalvik 
Executable (DEX) code.  The Dalvik virtual machine is a 
register-based process virtual machine used to run 
applications in the Android Operating System.  Designed by 
Google Engineer Dan Bornstein with contributions from other 
Google engineers, it minimizes memory requirements while at 
the same time allowing multiple VMs to run at the same time 
[5].  Dalvik relies on the operating system for process 
isolation, memory management, and threading control.  At 
compile time, a tool named dx, which is part of the Android 
SDK, reforms the Java Class files of the Java source, which 
are first compiled by a Java compiler into DEX code.  All 
of the DEX files for a single application are then zipped 
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into a single Android Package file (APK) [6].  These APK 
files are how applications are stored on a device.   
D. SECURITY 
Android applications run what is known as a “sandbox,” 
a separate portion of the operating system without access 
to other system resources without the permissions of the 
user, given at install time.  All permissions are coded 
when creating the manifest.xml file except one, root 
permission.  “Rooting” a device is the process of running 
code on a device to allow it to attain privileged control 
or “root” access within the Android system, allowing 
ability to change operating system parameters that are 
normally marked read-only.  On a rooted device, root user 
permissions are not part of the manifest file.  Root 
permissions are obtained while running the main.java file 
with admin privileges (SU) and executing the Process root = 
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(“su”) command.  Once this 
permission is given, the user will not be prompted for root 
permissions again for that specific application.  As 
described on the Android developer page: 
A central design point of the Android security 
architecture is that no application, by default, 
has permission to perform any operations that 
would adversely impact other applications, the 
operating system, or the user. This includes 
reading or writing the user's private data (such 
as contacts or e-mails), reading or writing 
another application's files, performing network 
access, keeping the device awake, etc. [4] 
Due to the fact that Android sandboxes, i.e., 
isolates, applications from each other, applications must 
explicitly share resources and data. They do this by 
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declaring the permissions they need for additional 
capabilities not provided by the basic sandbox. 
Applications statically declare the permissions they 
require, and the Android system prompts the user for 
consent at the time the application is installed. Android 
has no mechanism for granting permissions dynamically (at 
run-time) because it complicates the user experience to the 
detriment of security [7]. 
E. MOBILE DEVICE SENSORS 
Once necessary permissions have been granted, an 
application can access the plethora of hardware sensors 
installed in the mobile device using the Android APIs.  The 
APIs use Java classes built into the Android library, to 
give applications the ability to use the built-in sensors 
to measure certain aspects of the device’s environment, 
allowing use of them as contexts on which to allow access 
to other applications. 
1. International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity Numbers 
(IMSI) were created and formatted to provide the unique 
international identification of mobile terminals and mobile 
users to enable those terminals and users to roam among 
public networks, which offer public network services.   
The IMSI assignment guidelines and procedures are 
maintained by the IMSI Oversight Council (IOC).  Telcordia 
Technologies is responsible for administering the 
assignment and use of IMSIs in the United States and other 
North American Numbering Plan (NANP) countries [8].  
Telcordia Technologies, as IMSI Administrator, participates 
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in the management of all segments of the IMSI, but directly 
administers only the Home Network Identity (HNI) segment.  
HNIs are assignable to operators of public mobility 
services with international roaming capabilities. The HNI 
uniquely identifies the home network of a public mobility 
service subscriber and contains the Mobile Country Code 
(MCC) and the Mobile Network Code (MNC). The remaining 
segment of the IMSI, the Mobile Station Identification 
Number (MSIN), is directly administered by the network 
operator to which the HNI is assigned [8].  Figure 2 
depicts the IMSI breakdown. 
 
Figure 2.   IMSI Breakdown 
The MSIN is the portion of the IMSI that is the unique 
identifier used in the context check portion of the 
application.  The IMSI itself is coded onto the subscriber 
identity module (SIM) card, which also stores security 
authentication and ciphering information used by the 
network providers to authenticate the user to the network 
[9].  The SIM card also stores the Ki, a 128-bit value used 
in authenticating the SIM to the mobile network [10].  The 
SIM card is specifically designed not to allow the 
retrieval of the Ki, using the standard card interface used 
by the mobile device itself, making access to the Ki 
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impossible without access to the carrier’s databases and a 
poor choice for a context check. 
2. Cellular Identification Number 
A Cellular Identification number (CID) is a 
geographically unique number used to identify a Base 
Transceiver Station (BTS) or a sector of a BTS within a 
Location Area Code (LAC) [11].  A BTS is a piece of 
equipment used in GSM that facilitates communication 
between the user equipment (i.e., mobile device) and a 
service provider’s network.  A LAC is a set of base 
stations that are grouped together in order to optimize 
signaling.  A Base Station Controller (BSC) is the system 
that handles allocation of radio channels and controls 
handovers of the device from base station to base station.  
When the mobile device initially connects to a cell tower, 
five numerical codes that represent the network to which 
the device is connecting are exchanged in the handshake; 
the state of the tower to which device is connected, the 
mobile country code, the carrier’s code, the location area 
code and the CID [11].  The device uses the CID to assist 
the GPS system (if the device is A-GPS capable) to narrow 
down its location prior to getting satellite signals.  The 
geographical uniqueness of the CID makes it a good simple 
choice for use as a context in the application.   
3. Global Positioning System 
Global positioning system, better known as GPS, is a 
satellite-based, all-weather navigation system.  GPS 
utilizing a satellite constellation of 24 active and 
4 spare satellites strategically place in precise 
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geosynchronous orbit all around Earth.  The system became 
operational in 1994, under the original title NAVSTAR GPS, 
under control of the United States Air Force [12].     
Essentially, for GPS to work, the mobile device’s GPS 
receiver must locate four or more of the satellites in the 
constellation and calculate the distances to each to deduce 
its precise location.  This process is known as 
Trilateration.  To be able to perform this calculation, the 
GPS receiver must know two things; the locations of at 
least three of the satellites it can see and the distances 
to the satellites.  The GPS receiver deduces this 
information by analyzing high frequency radio signals 
emitted by the satellites themselves.  Using precise timing 
measurements, the device can calculate the distance to each 
satellite by analyzing how long it took for the emitted 
signal to travel to the device from the satellite, known as 
propagation time.  This timing is calculated using what is 
known as a pseudo-random code.  At a previously determined 
time, set by system designers, both the satellite and GPS 
receivers begin running the same digital pattern dictated 
by the code.  The satellite transmits this signal precisely 
as it is run.   
Upon receipt of the satellites’ signals, the GPS 
receiver compares the lag between its own code and that in 
the received signals.  The length of delays between the 
signals is the signals’ travel time.  Multiplying the delay 
time by the speed of light, 3X10^8 m/s, results in the 
distance traveled by the signal.  Along with its 
identifying information, GPS satellites transmit data 
containing its current location and current time, as 
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measure by the onboard atomic clock.  Signals from the 
satellites all broadcast on the same frequencies; using 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) allows messages from 
individual satellites to be distinguished from others using 
unique encodings for each satellite (the receiver must be 
aware of these encodings in order to distinguish the 
satellite signals).  Once distances to the four satellites 
are calculated and the locations of the satellites are 
known, the intersection of all four distances will result 
in one point indicating the receiver’s location 
Due to the inability to spoof or fake a GPS signature 
(with built in anti-spoofing in the signal transmitted), it 
was a logical context on which to base access.  Depending 
on the device, the overall accuracy differences using GPS 
are significant.  With the circa 2000 removal of Selective 
Availability, the intentional insertion of timing errors 
into the GPS system to limit accuracy of non-military GPS 
receivers, one can expect accuracies on the order of 
10 meters, depending on the chipset installed in the 
device. 
4. Application Program Interfaces 
Through the use of the LocationManager and 
TelephonyManager classes built into the Android Java SDK, a 
programmer can access a device’s IMSI, CID and GPS 
location.  These services allow applications to check for 
periodic updates to the system’s location based on Global 
Positioning System measurements, cellular identification 
number, and/or a wireless router to which the device is 
currently connected, utilizing the built-in device hardware 
available [13].  Using a background service, these 
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parameters can be periodically checked allowing a 
programmer to base contexts on them [18].  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the concept of Bring Your Own 
Device policies, the advantages/disadvantages of those 
policies, the Android operating system and its 
advantages/disadvantages and mobile device sensors and 
capabilities.  It is meant to provide an understanding for 
an understanding of concepts used in the architectural 













This chapter presents an overview of the architecture 
used to design a context-based application to include 
background services, context checks, user authentication 
and the secure enclave.  It describes how the contexts 
themselves are designed to include which contexts were 
chosen, and why, and the design of the enclave and its 
protection mechanisms. 
B. APPLICATION CONTEXT DESIGN 
The end-state goal of this thesis is to create a 
service capable of securing applications on a mobile device 
based on the contexts setup and controlled by the service.  
Using the built-in hardware common to most mobile devices 
and the Android SDK, it is possible to utilize the hardware 
as locational/user verification checks in the application.  
Once the contexts have been verified, the user can be 
allowed to run the secured applications (enclave).  Figure 




Figure 3.   Context Check Use Case 
1. Location Verification Context 
The purpose of this context is to verify a user’s 
location.  An administrator or chaperone of restricted 
information may not want anyone to access the information 
if they are physically located outside of a specific 
location.  An example of this might be an emergency 
responder located within a disaster area having access to 
emergency medical data about certain persons residing 
within the disaster area.  The advantage of using location 
as a context, is that most mobile devices have multiple 
ways of determining and verifying their location (e.g., 
Base Transceiver Station (BTS) to which the device is 
currently associated, wireless access point to which the 
device is currently connected and GPS).   
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a. Cellular Identification Number 
Identification of the BTS to which the device is 
associated can be used as a location identifier in certain 
contexts, as long as the BTS is stationary.  Since each BTS 
identifier (CID) is geographically unique, using a 
combination of the most recent BTSs to which the mobile 
device has connected, a fairly reliable location can be 
determined.  Once the CID is obtained, the application 
needs only to reference a table of approved CIDs to 
determine if the context is met.  If the CID to which the 
device is associated is in the table of approved CIDs, the 
context is met.  Pairing a CID context check with a more 
secure context is necessary due to the ability to spoof 
CIDs.   
b. Global Positioning System 
A mobile devices geographical location can be a 
strong and secure context on which to base access to the 
enclave.  Similar to CID, the mobile device will calculate 
its geographical location using the built-in GPS system, 
but instead of comparing the coordinates to a preset list 
of approved coordinates, another calculation is done.  The 
application takes the approved coordinates and calculates a 
radius around those coordinates, essentially creating a GPS 
fence.  If the device’s measured GPS coordinates fall 
within the calculated GPS fence coordinates, the context is 
met.  To prevent unauthorized interference with the GPS 
system, the system employs a method of encryption to 
prevent spoofing. (A spoofing attack is a situation in 
which one person or program successfully masquerades as 
another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an 
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illegitimate advantage.)  Embedded within the transmitted 
signals from the GPS satellites, lies the P-Code (precision 
code), an encrypted Pseudorandom Number (PRN) unique to 
each satellite to prevent spoofing.  This difficulty in 
spoofing a GPS signal makes it one of the strongest 
contexts on which to base access to the enclave.  The 




Figure 4.   Context Pseudo-code 
Once location has been verified for context 
checking, verification of the user must be accomplished 
prior to granting access to the secure enclave. 
2. User Verification Context 
The purpose of this context check is to verify the 
identity of the user attempting to access the secure 
enclave.  Users can be authenticated in several different 
ways, the most common being challenge-response.  In this 
application, challenge-response protocol was chosen for 




Challenge-response authentication is a protocol 
in which one is presented with a question (challenge) and 
must respond with a valid answer (response) to be 
authenticated.  The simplest example of challenge-response 
is password authentication, where the challenge is the 
password prompt and the response is the password.   
b. International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
As discussed earlier, the International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a unique identifying number 
associated with GSM and LTE mobile phone users.  The 
providers use this number as a unique identifier, stored on 
the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, installed in the 
device, to verify the users identity with the system as 
opposed to an International Mobile Equipment Identifier 
number, which identifies a specific mobile device.  This 
application will use the IMSI as a verification of the 
user’s identity as one of the contexts.  Similar to CID, 
the application will have a secure database that stores the 
approved IMSIs, controlled by the system administrator, 
which will allow access to the applications stored within 
the enclave.  Along with IMSI, a policy requiring the user 
to lock their mobile devices with a complex password/pin 
helps verify the identity of the user and strengthens the 
security of the device. 
C. ENCLAVE DESIGN 
The enclave will consist of a list of applications 
deemed to need special access controls.  These applications 
will be fully installed on the device, but the user will 
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not have the ability to run them until they meet the 
selected access controls (contexts). 
The primary means of preventing access to the 
applications residing within the enclave is a capability of 
interrupting the launch process (intent) of the restricted 
application.  An Intent is an abstract description of an 
operation to be performed, such as starting an activity.  
When an application is launched, an intent is fired for the 
main activity within the application being launched [14].  
Recognition of this launch process, when properly 
identified, allows it to be paused in order to query for 
required context checks. 
The administrator chooses the contexts that are 
required to open a restricted application during the system 
setup in the admin settings of the enclave application.  
Here, the administrator can decide the contexts for which 
he/she would like to check and the settings for those 
contexts.   
The design of the context checker is what enables the 
enclave to be properly protected.  A service that runs in 
the background of the operating system periodically checks 
the last known GPS coordinates, monitors currently 
associated CID, and watches for firing of intents in order 
to identify when the user has launched an protected 
application. 
When a user attempts to launch a protected application 
the contexts that are required are checked individually.  
Based on the results of the contexts queries, the user is 
either granted, or denied, access to the protected 
applications.  There is no possible way to launch any of 
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the applications under the enclave’s protection via the 
user interfaces, without meeting the contexts.  To ensure 
proper security, the contexts to enter an enclaved 
application are checked each and every time any protected 
application is launched/re-launched. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a high-level view of the 
architecture of an application that securely restricts 
access to other applications using hardware sensor readings 
of the device as contexts on which to base access.  The 
major portions of the design are the application context 
design and the design of the enclave itself.  The next 
chapter will discuss the actual implementation of this 
architectural design into a working Android application. 
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This chapter explains in detail the implementation of 
the architecture described in Chapter III of this thesis.  
It includes coding methodology descriptions and 
walkthroughs as the Administrator and a user each of which 
meets or does not meet the required contexts to open a 
protected application.  The application was written for 
rooted Android devices, firmware 1.6 and up, and consists 
of 20 classes and over 2,000 lines of Java code.  Root 
permissions allow the application admin privileges allowing 
it to access LogCat, to monitor for protected application 
launches.  The enclave application was installed and tested 
on a Samsung Galaxy Note running Android OS 2.3.6 
(codenamed Gingerbread) with root permissions.  
The following sections discuss our Android application 
that implements the architectural design discussed in 
Chapter III of this thesis, hereafter referred to as the 
enclave application.  The enclave application implements 
all of the features of the architectural design. 
1. Key Features 
 Administrator Login with challenge/response user 
verification. 
 Administrator capability to select mobile 
device’s sensors to use as contexts. 
 Administrator capability to modify contextual 
requirements to launch enclaved applications. 
 Administrator capability to lock ProgramManager 
to prevent force-quit or uninstall of the enclave 
application. 
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 Ability to stop the launch of an enclaved 
application unless the administrator-selected 
contexts are satisfied. 
B. ADMINISTRATOR 
This section will describe system setup by an 
administrator or person controlling the access to the 
restricted information/application. It will discuss initial 
install and setup of the application, security settings and 
how to include applications in the enclave, to include an 
explanation as to how the code accomplishes this. 
1. Application Installation 
The application will be provided to the administrator 
as an APK (Android Package File), ready to install on the 
desired device.  During installation, the administrator 
will be prompted to accept the user permissions required on 
the device.  The permissions required to run the 
application are as follows:  Fine GPS Location, Network 
Communication, Read Sensitive Log Data, and Read Phone 
Status and ID, system tools and root.  Once installation is 
complete, the application will place a launcher icon in the 
Android application drawer labeled Latchkey App Protector.  






Figure 5.   Application Installation Screen 
a. Permissions 
The various permissions necessary to install and 
run the enclave application enable the program to access 
the features and perform the functions required to meet 
architectural specifications.  The Fine GPS Location and 
Network Communication permissions are required to allow the 
application to query the device for the necessary sensor 
information to determine the phone’s location based on GPS 
and CID, respectively.  The Read Phone State and ID 
permissions are required to allow the enclave application 
to query for the IMSI associated with the installed SIM 
card [15]. Root permissions are required to allow the 
application to read phone logs and pause/kill the launch 
activities of applications other than itself. 
2. Admin Settings 
After launching the application, root permissions are 
required prior to continuing. If the enclave application is 
installed on a non-rooted device, the program fails to 
attain root permissions at this point, resulting in the 
application force-quitting.  The root permissions are 
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required to read the LogCat to monitor for application 
launches.  Without access to LogCat, the enclave service 
will not function as designed.  If root permissions are 
granted, the enclave application is launched and the 
administrator is prompted for an admin password, defaulted 
to 1234 after installation.  Once the correct password is 
entered, the administrator can now use the context menus 
within the application to configure the security settings 
and select the applications to be protected. Figure 6 shows 
the application configuration screens. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Application Configuration Screens 
a. Protection Settings 
In the protection settings menu, the 
administrator can select the contexts on which the enclave 
access is to be based (i.e., IMSI, CID, and/or GPS).  This 
was done using a simple Boolean indicating whether the 
context was selected or not.  Upon selecting “Save 
Settings” the selected context settings are saved using the 
SharedPreferences class built into the Android SDK.  The 
SharedPreferences class provides a general framework that 
allows you to save and retrieve persistent key-value pairs 
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of primitive data types [16]. SharedPreferences can be used  
to save any primitive data: booleans, floats, ints, longs, 
and strings. This data will persist across user sessions 
(even if your application is “killed”).  Figure 7 depicts 
the protection selection screen. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Application Protection Selection Screen 
b. Change Password 
The Change Password selection in the 
configuration menu simply allows the administrator to 
change the admin password, given that the old password is 
known.  The stored passwords are also stored in 
SharedPreferences.  It is important to note that a 
compromise of the administrator password will compromise 





Figure 8.   Application Password Change Screen 
c. Change IMSI 
The Change IMSI selection in the configuration 
menu allows the administrator to change the IMSIs on which 
to base access to the protected applications.  Here, using 
a context menu, the administrator can add and delete IMSIs 
that are saved in SharedPreferences.  As discussed in 
previous chapters, the IMSI is simply a unique identifier 
associated with the SIM card installed on the device, 
issued by the service provider, which can be spoofed and/or 
duplicated, making it a poor context check if not used in 
conjunction with other context parameters.  Figure 9 





Figure 9.   Application Change IMSI Screen 
d. Change CellID 
The Change CellID selection from the 
configuration menu allows the administrator to change the 
Cellular Identification numbers on which to base access to 
the protected applications.  Like the Change IMSI option, 
the administrator can add and delete CIDs using the context 
menu, which is then stored in SharedPreferences.  As with 
IMSIs, CIDs can be spoofed and/or duplicated making it a 
weak security context check on its own.  It is also 
important to note that a mobile device can jump between 
several cellular towers even while stationary making it 
necessary to add all CIDs geographically located in 
proximity to each other, unless a specific CID is required.  




Figure 10.   Application Change CID Screen 
e. Change Geolocation 
The Change Geolocation selection from the 
configuration menu allows the administrator to change the 
GPS coordinates that the enclave application uses to build 
the GPS fence on which to base access to the protected 
applications.  Changing the GPS coordinates only changes 
the center point of the GPS fence used in the geolocation 
context and not the size of the fence itself, which is a 
fixed five nautical mile value.  The GPS context check, 
done during the launch of an enclaved application, verifies 
that the device is geographically located within five 
nautical miles of the administrator’s set GPS coordinates.  
It is possible to set several different GPS locations that 
are in proximity to each other to create a larger GPS 




Figure 11.   Application Change GPS Screen 
3. Add App 
The Add App selection from the context menu allows the 
administrator to select the applications to protect (i.e., 
place under enclave protection).  Once Add App is selected, 
the enclave application provides the administrator with a 
list of all Main activities stored on the device.  A Main 
activity is the activity within an application that allows 
it to launch in a Dalvik VM [17].  Selecting a launch 
activity, within this menu, adds it to a list stored in the 
enclave applications SharedPreferences.  It is only 
possible to enter an application on the Android OS via the 
applications associated Main activity, delineated in the 
applications associated manifest file.  Upon exiting this 
menu, the administrator is presented with a list of the 
application launch activities that are selected and stored 
in SharedPreferences, which will be used later in the 
background service. 
It is important to note that selecting applications 
that are to be locked are not the only selections that must 
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be made on this step of the configuration.  The 
administrator must also lock any applications or system 
settings that provide for stopping other applications or 
uninstalling packages (i.e., program manager) [4] in order 
to keep a user from force-quitting or uninstalling the 
enclave application itself.  This requires an in depth 
knowledge of the launching applications and the system 
settings of the device on which the enclave application is 
to be installed.  Failure to lock these features would 
allow a malicious user to force-quit or uninstall the 
enclave application thereby completely removing its 
security features. 
4. Start Hiding 
Once the administrator has configured all of the 
security settings for the enclave and selected the 
applications that are to be included in the enclave, he/she 
must click the Start Hiding button to enable the security 
features and “lock the enclave.”  Once the Start Hiding 
button is clicked, the enclave application starts a 
background service that monitors the Android LogCat log.  
Android LogCat contains logs from various applications and 
portions of the system that are collected in a series of 
circular buffers, which then can be viewed and filtered by 
the logcat command.  LogCat can be viewed from an ADB shell 
to view the log messages.  ADB (Android Debug Bridge) is a 
tool that comes with the Android SDK that allows you to 
control and interface with your Android device [18]. 
The enclave application uses this method to monitor 
the LogCat log for application launches.  The background 
service is essentially looking for activity launch events 
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that correspond to the launch activities that were selected 
by the administrator during the Add App portion of the 
enclave application configuration.  When an activity launch 
is detected, the background service checks to see if the 
activity being launched matches one selected by the 
administrator to be protected. 
C. USER 
The intended user of the enclave application is a 
person who requires access to restricted applications/ 
information when a preselected set of contexts is met.  The 
enclave application can be preinstalled on an issued device 
or directly installed on a user’s personal device and 
configured by a system administrator.  Even when installed 
on the user’s personal device, the administrator privileges 
of the service are protected with a password.  When the 
user attempts to launch a restricted application one of two 
things will occur: the contexts are satisfied and the 
application launches or the contexts are not satisfied and 
the launch of the application is blocked. 
1. Launching a Protected Application 
Upon attempting to launch a protected application, the 
background service, running since the administrator 
configured the enclave application, senses the launch via 
LogCat.  If the activity name matches one of the selected 
activities to be protected, the activity of the protected 
application is then halted and the context checking 
activity of the enclave application is started. 
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a. Contexts Satisfied 
The context checking activity of the enclave 
application checks to verify that the contexts configured 
by the administrator during setup are met.  IMSI, CID 
and/or GPS coordinates are queried and checked to see if 
they match the values stored in SharedPreferences.  If the 
contexts are met, the user is shown that the contexts are 
satisfied and they are given the option of clicking 
continue, thereby un-pausing the restricted application and 
allowing it to run as usual.  An “Access Granted” screen is 
shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Context Monitor Screen 
b. Contexts Not Met 
As above, the context checking activity of the 
restricted application, upon launch, will attempt to verify 
if the contexts required to access a protected application 
are satisfied.  If any of the contexts set by the 
administrator are not satisfied, the launching activity of 
the restricted application is killed and the user is not 
allowed to continue until the contexts are met.  The access 
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denied screen is shown in Figure 12.  It is important to 
note that if the user navigates away from an application 
that is under protection, the contexts will be checked once 
again upon returning, and in the event they are not met, 
the user will not be allowed back into the application and 
all unsaved data will be lost. 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, the enclave application prototype 
satisfies all of the architectural design requirements 
presented in Chapter III of this thesis.  The enclave 
application has the capability to protect and restrict the 
launch of selected applications on an Android device based 
on selected contexts using the hardware sensors built into 
the mobile device itself. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has developed an advanced Android service 
extending the ideas presented in a thesis written by Kevin 
J. LaFrenier [2] in September 2011.  The idea was to create 
a method of protecting restricted applications on an 
Android device from compromise by constraining the 
applications’ launch based on a set of contexts over which 
the user has no control. 
We used the Android Java SDK and its associated 
libraries in the Eclipse IDE (Integrated Development 
Environment) to build a prototype application that 
prevented the launch of other, preselected applications, 
based on a set of contexts measured by the mobile device’s 
hardware.  
The first portion of the thesis defined the contexts 
on which to base access to the protected applications.  The 
first context used in the service was the physical location 
of the mobile device.  The enclave service uses two means 
of determining location: Cellular Identification Number 
assigned to the Base Transceiver Station and Global 
Positioning System Coordinates.  Both of these values are 
measured using the built-in Android LocationManager class 
utilizing the mobile device’s hardware.  Once these values 
are obtained, they are crosschecked with the list of 
approved CIDs and GPS coordinates; the list of approved 
values being configured on installation by the system 
administrator to either allow or no to allow access to the 
sensitive applications, also selected by the administrator.  
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The second context coded into the service is the 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).  Since 
IMSIs are attached to user accounts, it was chosen as a 
pseudo-verification of the user and/or device.  The 
TelephonyManager class of the Android SDK is used to query 
for the IMSI assigned to the SIM card installed on the 
device.  This measured IMSI is then crosschecked with a 
list of approved IMSIs to determine whether or not to allow 
access to a protected application.  
Based on the measured contexts, once met, the user is 
allowed to launch any of the protected applications.  If 
one or more of the selected contexts are not met, the 
enclave service uses the Android OS to block the launch of 
the application, until said contexts are satisfied.  Once 
set-up, the enclave service successfully restricts 
launching an application based on a set of contexts 
utilizing hardware already installed on the device.  Since 
the contexts are only checked at launch time, there is no 
protection if any of the contexts fails after the user has 
launched an application. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The design and creation of this prototype enclave 
service was intended to show that it is possible to build a 
service that successfully restricts access to other 
applications based on a set of contexts.  There are still 
several areas requiring further research prior to 
deployment.  These areas focus on user identification, 
multi-level contexts, remote context changes, and user 
termination resistance. 
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1. User Identification 
In creating the enclave application, the idea of user 
identification was ignored in order to focus on designing a 
protection scheme reliant on the mobile device’s sensors as 
contexts.  In a real-world deployment of a security 
service, the users themselves must be verified prior to 
allowing access to restricted applications.  The addition 
of a context employing a challenge/response protocol would 
serve as a reliable means of user identification prior to 
using the mobile device’s resources to unnecessarily check 
contexts in the event the user is unauthorized. 
2. Multi-level Contexts 
A single device might contain differing levels of 
protected applications.  In this situation, an enclave 
service that allows for the use of differing contexts based 
on the required protection level of the application the 
user is attempting to access will prevent an over-
protection of certain applications.  As a result, a single 
device might contain multiple applications at differing 
protection levels, each able to be accessed at different 
moments in time/location by different users. 
A more complicated, tiered-context check would also 
make the enclave service more resilient to compromise.  An 
off-device context check, requiring the presence of other 
devices and/or users would provide this increased 
protection.  A simple presence check of other devices in 
the area in order to access restricted operations would 
prevent a compromised device, which may have fallen into 
malicious hands, from accessing restricted resources, 
thereby mitigating the compromise of the device. 
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Establishing a means of monitoring contexts while the 
user is accessing a protected application so that it can be 
killed if any of them fail at any time would provide an 
increased layer of protection.  This service would provide 
real-time protection to the enclaved applications. 
3. Remote Context Changes 
In the event that a device is lost or stolen, there is 
currently no means of keeping a malicious user from 
accessing the applications protected by the enclave service 
if the contexts are met.  A periodic means of updating the 
contexts stored in the SharedPreferences of the enclave 
application would provide an administrator or information 
manager the ability to remove contexts, essentially locking 
a device out of the protected applications.  The ability to 
add or change contexts remotely allows an administrator to 
grant/remove a device user’s access to a protected 
application, to which the user would not otherwise have had 
access.  
4. User Termination Resistance 
In the prototype enclave service, there are no 
standard protections keeping a user from self-terminating 
the enclave service.  The administrator, at setup time, 
must ensure that any application with force-stop and 
uninstall capabilities (i.e., Android PackageManager) are 
also under the enclave application’s protection.  This 
ensures that the contexts set to protect the applications 
within the enclave are met prior to allowing a user to be 
able to uninstall/force-quit any of those applications.  
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There are currently no automatic protections for keeping 
the enclave application from being force-quit or 
uninstalled by the user.  
In the event of a full mobile device reboot, the 
enclave service is not included in the boot procedure, 
therefore, it will not start and thus leaving the 
applications, previously protected based on context checks 
prior to the reboot, vulnerable.  The simple addition of an 
intent filter monitoring for the BOOT_COMPLETE action can 
start the background service in the event of a device 
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